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NOTE AND COMMENT
PUBLIC

UTILITY

VALUATION-CoST-OF-REPRODUcTION

THEORY

AND

THE

WORLD WAR.-The very grave objections to the cost-of-reproduction theory
of valuation of public utilities was pointed out at large in 15 MICH. L. REv.
2o5. The violent price changes following the World War have greatly
increased the weight of these objections to calling anything a base which
rests on such uncertainties and fluctuations as cost-of-reproduction. A base
should be stable, but this has the stability Of a flying machine. There had
been a rising curve of costs from 1893 to 1i16, but since that date the rise
has been almost vertical. The public utilities by- the thousands desire to
take advantage of it. They are as fond of cost-of-reproduction now as
they were of original cost in 1893, while for the public the transfer of affections has been reversed. Cost-of-reproduction has not proved a friend that
either party can trust, and if the present flight of prices comes back to
earth the utilities will have a revulsion of feeling to the efficient investment
theory of valuation for which the public just now exhibits a touching fondness. "The amusing, although regrettable," changes in attitude toward the
cost-of-reproduction rule have been stated with great clearness by the Indiana
Commission in Re Indianapolls Water Co., P. U. R. i919 A 448, 464. In
general, it may be said that the Commissions, being in more constant and
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intimate touch with conditions, are much more impressed by this than are
most of the courts.
Two recent decisions in this field have attracted wide attention and excited
great interest. In Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co. v. Lincoln, 25o U. S.
256 (June, igig), Mr. Justice Pitney said the company should be allowed
another application for relief, if it can show "upon evidence respecting
values, costs of operation and the current rates of return upon capital as
they stand at the time of bringing suit and are likely to continue thereafter,
that the rate is confiscatory in its effect under the. new conditions. It is
matter of common knowledge that, owing principally to the World War,
the costs of labor and supplies of every kind have greatly advanced. * * *
And it is equally well known that annual returns upon capital and enterprise
the world over have materially increased, so that what would have been a
proper rate of return for capital invested in gas plants and similar public
utilities a few years ago furnishes no safe criterion for the present or for
the future." The complications of determining cost-of-reproduction, and
rates based thereon, may be seen from the fact that in considering the problem for this lighting plant in a comparatively small city the Master had "an
enormous mass of evidence produced before him, and analyzed in his report.
In abridged form, it occupies nearly 2,000 pages of printed transcript in this
court, besides numerous tabular exhibits." Its bulk is not at all unusual in
valuations by the cost-of-reproduction method.
Fluctuations in wages, cost of materials, and money rates are inevitable,
but the amount of such fluctuations, and their effect upon a utility, are easily
capable of simple determination.
It is only when the value of the whole
plant is thrown into this sea of uncertainty that the Master finds swimming
difficult and safe landing impossible. If, owing to the World War, the value
of the utility has greatly advanced, then there is no firm base, no sure adjustment even for a day.
If value has greatly advanced, the next query is, has it kept pace with
the increase in prices of materials? Shall the utility be allowed added value
for materials actually put into the plant, and also for materials, composing
most of the plant, and which were purchased at the far lower prices prevailing when the plant was built or enlarged? In other words, shall rates
be based on the efficient investment representing the capital devoted to the
public use, with a rate of return equal to that prevailing today, or shall they
be based on the cost-of-reproduction today, at present prices of materials?
There is no doubt as to how the public will respond when asked to pay rates
on possibly double the capital actually invested simply because if the plant
were to be built today, which it is not, it would cost twice as much as it did.
Still, if it be an unchangeable rule of property that the owner of a public
utility is entitled to such appreciations of value, then the feeling of the
public has nothing to do with the question of right, and cost-of-reproduction
should be rigidly applied. On the other hand, if there is here a question of
policy and police power, and not a fixed rule of property, then each case may
be considered by itself, to be decided on reason and judgment and all the
circumstances of the case, past as well as present.
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That is what Charles E. Hughes, the Referee, concluded in a recent and
very much quoted opinion by him. This opinion, of course, derives great
force from the fact that Hughes as Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States rendered the opinion in the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S.
352. In Brooklyn Borough Gas Co. v. Public Service Coin., P. U. R. i9i8
F 335 (July, I918), Referee Hughes said: "While it is important to consider the cost of reproduction in determining the fair value of a plant for
rate-making purposes, it cannot be. said that there is a constitutional right
to have the rates of a public service corporation based upon the estimated
cost of the reproduction of its property at a particular time, regardless of
circumstances. To base rates upon a plant valuation simply representing a
hypothetical cost of reproduction at a time of abnormally high, prices due
to exceptional conditions would be manifestly unfair to the public, and likewise to base rates upon an estimated cost of reproduction far lower than the
actual bona fide and prudent investment because of abnormally low prices
would be unfair to the company." This is not to be confused with recognition of actual costs of operation, even though abnormal.
If the quotation justifies the conclusion that fairness to the utility and to
the public must be a determining factor in rate making, and that there is no
constitutional property right to prevent, then there seems no serious obstacle
to the contention that efficient investment and not cost of reproduction may
be made the base, if not by judicial, then by legislative act. Many commissions, at all events, seem minded to come to that basis. In the Brooklyn
Borough Gas Case itself the New York Commission in 1914, by computing
the cost of reproduction as of that date, arrived at a base figure "covering
the amount at which every unit of property stands in the capital account.
This inventory or appraisal can easily be kept up to date, so that an investigation as to the rates or prices charged for gas can be made very expeditiously. The company on its part will be able to present to banking houses
and investors a balance sheet virtually approved by the Public Service Commission." In other words, the commission seems to have approved the
efficient investment theory. The amount of such investment up to 1914 was
incapable of ascertainment from the books, and so a basing value was necessarily secured in another way. But this once agreed upon, and a system of
accounting adopted, the value at any future date could be taken from the
books. (See also to this point, Biddeford & Saw Water Co. v. Itself, P. U.
R. 192o B 580, 592.) The value at any day will be this 1914 base, plus capital investment added since.

This is the method urged in 15 MIcH. L. RiXv.

2o5. The board of directors, refusing to "admit the right of the Commission
to impose the conditions above mentioned," "as matter of policy" accepted
them and for the time acted upon them.
The merry tangle of learned referees, learned justices and commissioners,
of legislature, commissions and courts, of Special Term, Appellate Division,
First Department and Second Department, as the litigants vainly scurried
through the labyrinth of the New York courts and commissions, may be followed by the curious reader in 171 N. Y. S. 937, 175 N. Y. S. 28, 176, 918,
178 N. Y. S. 94, 179 N. Y. S. 912, i8o N. Y. S. 48. But the parties are not
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yet out. The rate to be charged for gas has not been finally passed on even
by the Supreme Court, which in New York is not supreme, and the Court
of Appeals has not yet had a chance at the case, not to speak of the possibilities if the parties should start traveling through the Federal Courts.
Meantime the "learned Referee," ex-Justice Hughes, notwithstanding some
injuries suffered at the hands of at least one "learned justice," is still in fair
condition, though it does not yet appear with certainty how his opinion will
look when the courts get all done with it. Meantime it has been so much
quoted elsewhere as almost to attain the influence of an authority.
Re Capital Traction Co., P. U. R. 1919 F 779, 898, in an elaborate opinion
of i6o pages, adopts the 1914 before the war value, plus added costs at the
higher prices paid since that date. The D. C. Commission declined "to
hold that the users of the service of a public utility at the very time when
called upon to make great sacrifices because of a world-Anide war should
also be required to pay higher rates merely to enable such a utility, without
the corresponding expenditure of a single dollar by way of increase of its
pre-war investment, to reap a profit from the high level of prices which the
very conflict has brought about." Is not this statement of conditions in time
of war equally applicable to conditions at any time? The Minnesota Commission, in Re Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co., P. U. R. 1919 C 5, in passing on
a petition for emergency relief, held that corporations, as well as individuals,
must bear their share of the burdens of the war and sustain some loss of
income without flinching. That a company or its employees should be
asked "to make sacrifices that car riders may get service at less than cost"
did not impress the court in Doherty v. Toledo Railways & L. Co., 254
Fed. 597.
A very interesting statement of present situations is made by the Indiana
Commission in Re Indianapolis Water Co., P. U. R. 1919 A 448, 464. Admitting cost-of-reproduction-less-depreciation "is now the prevailing method of
evaluation in Indiana," it adds that "a continued disposition toward this
method would rapidly lead into unfathomable depths of speculative regulation, and create a thoroughly artificial and unjust basis for property values,"
unfair in these times to the public, in times of depression to the utilities.
"There can be no better guide to or basis for rate making valuations than
honest and prudent investment." Cost-of-reproduction is too well intrenched
to permit a sudden and violent change, but there should be a gradual turning
toward prudent investment as the controlling factor. The commission flatly
refused to arbitrarily add an appreciation of $1,5ooooo due to the rising
prices of real estate. See also Re St. Joseph Ry. L. H. & P. Co., P. U. R.
The Michigan Commission well expressed the same in
192o A 542, 546.
Holland v. McGuire, P. U. R. 192o B i49, 164, quoting at length from Referee Hughes's opinion, supra. The Commission admitted great changes
caused by war prices, but did not think it "logical that the customers of a
public utility should be required to pay higher rates merely to enable a
utility, without the corresponding expenditure of a single dollar towards an
increase in its capital investment, to profit from a higher level of prices."
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That present-day, or war, prices cannot be taken as a proper basis for
valuation has been held by many commissions and some courts. See, for
examples, District of Columbia,--Re Capital TractionCo., P. U. R. 1919 F 799,
goi, quoting "a most eminent jurist, ex-Justice Hughes, as referee"; Illinois,
-Re Springfield Gas & E. Co., P. U. R. 192o A 446, 455, Re Freeport Gas
Co., P. U. R. ig2o, B 726, 741, Re Champaign & Urbana Water Co., P. U. R.
1919 R 798, 817, all quoting from the opinion of Referee Hughes; Massachusetts,--Re Boston Consolidated Gas Co., P. U. R. 1919 A 699, 702; Michigan,--Holland v. McGuire, P. U. R. 192o B 149, 164; Missouri,--Re St.
Joseph Ry. L. H. & P. Co., P. U. R. 192o A 542, 546; Nebraska,--Re Omaha
& C. B. St. R. Co., P. U. R. 1919 A 845, 849; New York,-N. Y. I. Water
Co. v. Mt. Vernon, x8o N. Y. S. 304; Utah,--Re Utah Light & T. Co., P.
U. R. 192o B 262, 270; Vermont--Re Colonial P. & L. Co., P. U. R. 192o
A 215, 218; Wisconsin,-Racine Water Co. v. R. Com., P. U. R. 1919 A
913, 926.
Such decisions are far from showing an adoption of the efficient or prudent investment theory, but they insist cost of reproduction must have relation to reasonably permanent cost prices. Often they base value on costs
on averages for a five-year or a ten-year period. Racine Water Co. v. Railroad Commission, supra, while in other cases the price curve is "smoothed
out" by taking 1912 or 1914 valuations as a base and adding betterments since
that date at actual cost. Re Wisconsin Traction, L. & H. P. Co., P. U. R.
,I919B 224, 229, and Milwaukee v. Wisconsin R. Com., P. U. R. 192o B 976,
991, expressing a preference for investment cost as a basis when there are
adequate and reliable records, Cf. Re Bloomer Electric L. & P.° Co., P.
U. R. 1919 B 48I,'483; Brooklyn Borough Gas Case, P. U. R. 1919 F 335,
per Hughes, Referee, quoted with approval in IV. Y. I. Water Co. v. City
of Mt. Vernon, i8o N. Y. S. 3o4; Re Kansas City Gas Co., P. U. R. 192o C
41, 50; Re Capital Traction Co., P. U. R. 1919 F 779, 899.
The recent cases in the courts, as contrasted with some by the commissions, in general continue to insist that neither cost-of-reproduction nor
original cost can be taken as the only basis for valuation, but every element
must be considered, with sound business judgment, to determine what is
fair and just to consumer and utility. However, chief emphasis is given to
cost-of-reproduction in most courts. State Pub. Utilities Com. v. Springfield
Gas & Elec. Co. (Ill,, Dec. 1919), 125 N E. 891; Ben Avon v. Ohio Valley
Water Co., 26o Pa. St. 289; Detroit v. Michigan R. Con. (Mich., April, 192o),
177 N. W. 3o6. See Re Iroquois Natural Gas Co., P. U. R. 1919 D 76, 85,
in which the utility vainly sought to submit only reproduction costs, and
Milwaukee v. Wisconsin Railroad Com. (Wis., Jan. 192o), P. U. R. 192o B
976, 990, expressing a strong preference for considering "investment prudehtly made," especially at a time of very widely fluctuated costs and abnormal conditions. With this may be contrasted the opinion of Booth, J., in
the U. S. Dist. Ct., March 4, i92o, in Winona v. Wisconsin-Minnesota L. &
P. Co. The opinion objects to the use of the words "normalT "abnormal,"
and seems to rely wholly on cost-of-reproduction at the time the value is
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being fixed, with rates based thereon, "even though this adjustment may fit
a comparatively short period of years." There seems to be no other decision
going this length, unless it be the opinion on which Judge Booth relies, that
before referred to, of Justice Pitney in the Lincoln Gas Case, 250 U. S. 256.
Whether the language of that case will bear this interpretation is open to
doubt.
The opinion written by White, C. J., in U. S. ex rel. Kansas City So. Ry.
Co. v. Interstate Com. Com. (U. S. Sup. Ct., Mar. 8, 192o), has been thought
to show an inclination of the court to disapprove the Minnesota Rate Cases
in so far as they refused to base land values on the "present cost of condemnation and damages or of purchase in excess of such original cost or
present value." The point involved was this: Congress in 1913 ordered the
Interstate Commerce Commission "to investigate, ascertain and report the
value of all property owned or used by every common carrier subject to the
provisions of this act." The Commission was directed to ascertain, among
other things, the cost of reproduction, with the original cost of all lands,
rights of way, etc., "and the present value of the same, and separately the
original and present cost of condemnation and damages or of purchase in
excess of such original cost or, present value." Following the Minnesota
Rate Cases, the Commission held that because of the impossibility of making
the self-contradictory assumptions such a theory requires, this could not be
done. Mandamus was asked to compel the Commission to make such valuations. The trial court and Court of Appeals denied relief. But the
Supreme Court reversed this on the ground that the only question involved
was "the non-action of the Commission in a matter purely ministerial."
'There was the direct and express command of Congress and the unequivocal
refusal of the Commission to obey. The court found it impossible to conceive how the Minnesota Rate ruling could furnish ground for such refusal.
This does not show that the Minnesota Rate Cases are in any point overruled, but it may mean that the court does not understand them as they have
been understood by the Commission, and possibly by the public. What this
means as to the cost-of-reproduction theory does not yet appear. In any
event, the Commissions answer 'Impossible" to a command of Congress
does not pass.
On the whole, it can hardly be said that the present high prices have
induced the courts to turn from the "fair value" theory of Smyth v. Anws,
169 U. S. 466, with all its speculative uncertainties, but many of the commissions have flatly expressed a preference for "prudent investment" as a
basis for valuation, and more and more the courts are recognizing that the
legislatures have endeavored to make utility commissions to which these
problems can safely be trusted for final settlement in all but a few exceptional cases calling for judicial interference. The office of commissioner is
"an office of dignity and great responsibility," and the courts should regard
his work as that of an expert that should not be "closely restricted by the
courts." Pu. Utilities Conp. v. Springfield Gas & E. Co. (IlL, I919), 125
306, 318.
N. E. 8.9, 895; Detroit v. Mich. R. Com. (Mich., 1920), 177 N. W.
E. C.
G.
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EvmgNc-DISPUTABLX PMESUMPTrONs; CAN THEY B4 WVGHIED ?-The evi-

dential force of presumptions under the California Civil Code, I96I, was considered and the statute construed in Everett v. Stazdard Accident Insurance
Co., -

Cal. -

, 187 Pac. 996.

The defense to an action on an insurance policy, by one claiming to be
the wife of the insured, was that she did not have that relationship because
the marriage ceremony under which she claimed occurred while the insured
had another wife then living. The question arose as to the effect upon the
determination of this question of fact of the presumption that the deceased
did not commit a crime in consummating the second marriage. The code
provision is as follows: "A presumption (unless declared by law to be conclusive) may be controverted by other evidence, direct or indirect, but unless
so controverted the jury are bound to find according to the presumption."
The code defines a presumption as, "A deduction which the law expressly
directs to be made from particular facts." It is to be noted that these two
provisions were really intended as but statutory declarations of the general
rule of law then existing.
The court construed this statute as requiring the presumption to be
weighed as evidence; that the words of the code, "other evidence," meant
evidence to be weighed against the presumption as evidence. To use the
language of the court in illustrating the principle to be applied, "Thus the
presuifiption of innocence of crime will support a verdict of acquittal in a
criminal case, though no evidence is offered to controvert the case of the
prosecution."
Professor Greenleaf started us on a legal heresy when he made the statement that "This presumption of innocence is to be regarded by the jury, in
every case, as matter of evidence, to the benefit of which the party is entitled."
GMEunNLEAV ON EVIDENCE, § 34. If a court were to instruct a jury to weigh
the presumption of innocence in the defendant's favor, where there was evidence tending to show guilt, what could it possibly mean to a jury or anyone
else? Can the presumption of innocence have one measure of probative value
in one case and a different one in some other case? Has it specific or variable
weight? If a variable weight, what are its variable factors? To weigh it is
to determine its weight, which means that it is likely to have different measures of probative value in different cases. If a juror, on getting an instruction to weigh the presumption, should request the court to explain what it
meant by the instruction, what consideration should determine its weight,
is there any possible thing the court can say in answer? One can attach one
measure of probative value or another to a particular fact, but is it thinkable
that this can be done to the presumption of innocence?
The language of the court quoted above that the presumption of innocence
will support an acquittal without evidence to controvert that of the prosecution means, and only can mean, that unless the prosecution in such a case
'has produced evidence of sufficient probative value to enable the jury to find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant must be acquitted. The presumption of innocence has nothing to do with that conclusion save to make
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it necessary for the prosecution to produce evidence for the jury to weigh if
it would make a case for their consideration at all.
The rule of the presumption under consideration operates only in the
absence of evidence opposed to the required conclusion. Where there is
such opposing evidence the law ceases to demand the conclusion. The presumption must then disappear and the contested fact must be determined
upon the evidence submitted. State v. Quigley, 26 R. I. 263.
Though the presumption under such circumstances disappears, the facts
to which the presumption attaches still remain in the case. Their natural
probative value is to be considered. Usually that probative value will be
considerable, else the law would not have raised the presumption.
The fallacy of the line of reasoning adopted in the case under discussion
was so clearly pointed out by the late Professor Thayer in his address before
the Yale Law School, with the case of Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432,
as a text, that little can be added. See THAYER'S PRELmINARY EvmEKC AT
THE COMMON LAW, 551. It is interesting to compare Halt v. United States,
218 U. S. 245, 253, with the opinion in. the Coffin case. The court still seems
to be of the same opinion as to what is the law, but thinks it law the jury
will not be likely to understand and: that it is better not to let them try. See
also in this same connection the earlier opinion in Agnew v. United States,
165 U. S. 36, rendered shortly after the publication of the address of Professor Thayer above referred to. Citation to some of the later cases follows.
In accord with the case under discussion, Grantham v. Ordway, Cal.
, 182 Pac. 73; Cowdry's Will, 77 Vt. 359. Contra, Duggan v. Bay State
Ry., 230 Mass. 370 ("The presumption of due care is not itself evidence. It
is a simple rule to which resort is had when there is a failure of evidence;
it is not evidence, but a rule about evidence"); Frank v. Wright, 140 Tenn.
535; Keliher v. United States, 193 Fed, 8, 23. A unique doctrine is that
announced in the opinion in Kauffman v. Logan, Iowa, , 174 N. W.
366, where the court says that where there is a conflict in the evidence over
the existence of a particular fact, such as that it is equally balanced between
the parties, that the jury should find the fact established in accordance with
the presumption, if one has been operative in the case. In other words,
assuming that the burden of proof upon the question of whether the fact
exists is upon the party in whose favor the presumption exists, then the jury
should be told that they must find for him, even though it cannot say that
the preponderance of the evidence is with him. A statement which seems to
refute itself.
V. H. L.

PRIvILEnD COMMUNICATION BETWEEN ATTORNEY AND

CLIENT-QUSTION

OF WHETHER THE RELATION EXISTS LEFT To JURY-PARTY ALLOWED To ASSIGN
ERROR ON RULING VIOLATING THE PRIVILEGE.-This procedure was justified in
the opinion in State v. Snook (Court of Errors and "Appeals of N. J., 1920),
iog At. 289. Snook was on trial for manslaughter charged as having been
committed by the reckless driving of an automobile. After the act, Mimmick,
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one of the persons in the automobile, and afterward a witness for the defense,
went to an attorney and had some conversation with him, the substance of
which, as testified to by the attorney, was a recital by M. of what had
occurred and an inquiry by him of the attorney as to what he should do.
In answer, he was advised to go to the police station and tell a truthful story,
and told that he did not need an attorney. l. offered to pay him, but was
did
told that there was no charge. The attorney further testified that he
not consider himself as retained.
The trial court held that the relation of attorney and client did not exist,
and that even if it did M. was the only person who could assert the privilege
growing out of it. The Supreme Court, where the case was next heard, held
that the question of whether the relation existed was one of fac-t and for the
jury. The Court of Errors and Appeal held that whether it was a pure
question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact, it was the sole province
of the court, as distinguished from the jury, finally to decide it. This court
further held that the undisputed evidence showed the relation to exist.
There is no doubt but that at one time it was the uniformly recognized
rule that all questions of admissibility were for the court finally to determine.
Nor did it matter that such questions must be determined upon contested
facts. Bartlett v. Smith, ii M. & W. 483; Burton v. State, lO7 Ala. lo8;
People v. Kraft, 148 .N. Y. 631; Cont. v. Robinson, 146 Mass. 571; Donnelly
v. State, 26 N. J. L. 463, are illustrative cases.
On the other hand, there is abundance of authority now for the practice
which allows the trial court to pass tentatively upon the evidence bearing
upon whether the relation does exist which would make the communication
confidential, allowing the evidence of the existence of the relationship, and
that of what the communication was, to go to the jury for their finding, the
communication to be considered if the jury finds the relationship did not
exist, and to be disregarded if it is found to have existed, The following
cases are examples of the application of this growing modem practice: Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 36 Mich. 502; Robinson v. State, 130 Ga. 361;
State v. Phillips, 118 Ia. 66o; State v. Doris, 51 Ore. 136.
The other important question discussed by the court was that of whether
the party against whom such a communication is erroneously admitted can
raise the question of privilege and assign error on the ruling of the court
admitting it.
In the case under discussion the question was raised under these circumstances: M., the client (as claimed by the defendant), was being examined
by the State's attorney. He had stated that he had a conversation with the
person claimed by the defendant to have been his attorney, and the objection
was interposed by defendant that the matter was privileged. Further examination was had to determine whether the relation of attorney and client
existed, after which the court held that it did not exist, "and even if it existed
M. was the only person who could claim the privilege." The defendant was
allowed an exception to the ruling. Later the State called the attorney to
contradict M. in respect to some portions of his testimony as to what was
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said in the conversation with him, the attorney. Objection was made to this
testimony by the defendant upon the ground that it was violating the privilege of M. to allow it. This was again overruled and an exception allowed.
The theory of the defendant's position was that the rule of privilege for
communications between attorney and client was founded in public policy,
and the maintenance of that public policy required the recognition of the
right in the party to take advantage of an erroneous ruling admitting the
communication.
The Court of Errors holds that, because it is a rule of public policy, its
violation is not to be disregarded, regardless of whether such violation is
prejudicial to the party making the objection. That a contrary rule would
result in the legal protection, which the law assumes to give to confidential
communications, being of no practical effect.
It may be said, as indeed it has been more than once, that the privileged
witness may refuse to answer, and thus compel a respecting of his privilege.
He may refuse to answer, but to do so is to assume a large measure of
responsibility for a layman, particularly if, as held in Doe v. .Egremont, 2
Moo. & Rob. 386, he is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in presenting
his claim. Certainly, if there is any other way of securing respect for his
privilege which does not involve defiance of the order of the court, it is
much better that it be followed.
But another fact is not to be overlooked. In many cases where the question of privilege arises, the person entitled is not before the court, but its
violation is attempted through another, whereas in others the person entitled
must be the witness, as in cases involving the matter of self-crimination. The
claim of privilege for communications between attorney and client is an
illustration of the former. Much legal discussion fails to differentiate these
cases, So clear a thinker as Professor Wigmore has not too well pointed
this distinction. In his general discussion of the question of who may claim
the privilege, he tells us of the proper procedure where the client is the witness, but does not help us much where the attorney is thi witness. He says:
"The only interest injured is that of the witness himself, who has been forced
to comply with a supposed duty which, as between himself and the State,
did not exist; his remedy was to refuse to obey and appeal for vindication
if the court had attempted improperly to use compulsory process of contempt.
But the opposite view naturally possesses attraction for those courts-and
they are in the majority-who cannot evade the Anglo-Norman instinct to
look upon litigation as a legalized sport, of orthodox respectability, with
high stakes, the game to be conducted according to strict rules, under judicial supervision, and to be won or lost according as these rules are observed
or disregarded."

"zIcMORE

ON EVIDENCt, § 2196.

Assuming that the attor-

ney with whom the client had his relation as such is the witness, and the
client is not before the court, is Professor Wigmore's suggested procedure
practical? As would be his duty, the attorney objects to the request to disclose, but his claim of privilege for the communication is overruled. Is there
not danger that some poorly nourished, anemic attorney may look upon the
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vicarious sacrifice of his liberty in the interest of a client, now dead or lost.
or both, it may be, and to whom he may have contributed his fee, as a bit
too serious, and permit the court to coerce the disclosure, rather than to be
forced to contemplate his high-mindedness in such narrow isolation as
would probably await him if he did otherwise? Is he not quite likely to be
of the opinion that the better way is to permit the party to pursue his "legalized sport" and have his exception?
The cases upon the general question are very well gathered in the notes
to § 2196 of WIGMOaM ON EVIDENCE, above noticed, and to the 6ther sections
there referred to. Space forbids extended analysis of the cases, but it may
be noted that those cited by Professor Wigmore, with few exceptions, present the question where the person whose privilege is involved is the witness,
or where there was held to be a waiver of the privilege shown by the testimony.
With regard to such cases, it will be borne in mind that the law has no
prohibition against asking a witness for a disclosure of that which he is
-privileged as well to make as to withhold. It follows that, though a party
may be entitled to take advantage of an erroneous ruling compelling disclosure, he has no right to object to the request for disclosure.
To summarize: (a) Under no circumstances should there be recognized
a claimed right in a party to assign error on a ruling permitting a party to
request the disclosure of a confidential communication between attorney and
client. (b) Though the client-witness whose privilege is involved may know
that he has -a right to defy the court, go to jail, and, it may be, so effectuate
his privilege, it is more often the case that he does not appreciate that he
has such a right, and in any event the ruling of the court directing disclosure
is really coercive, and he will usually disclose rather than be ordered to jail.
The privilege under such circumstances is of no real value. (c) To attempt
so to coerce a disclosure from the attorney is much more unreasonable. His
interest is purely professional, and can scarcely be said to be unprofessional
if he obeys the order of the court to disclose. (d) The only other practical
way of protecting the privilege is that which puts the party who insists upon
disclosure in the position where he imperils his case if he does so without
legal right.
It will not be overlooked that "the question is radically different where
the court erroneously recognizes a privilege and excludes evidence admissible
because there is none in law. In such case the party has been deprived of
evidence to which the law entitled him, while in the other case evidence has
been received against a party the admissibility of which depended upon the
will of another over whom the party had no control.
In accord with the case under discussion may be cited: State v. Barrows,
,
Fla. 52 Conn. 323; Bacon v. Frisbie,8o N. Y. 394; Stinson v. State, 8o So. 5o6. Contra: Dowie's Estate, 135 Pa. St. 210; Matthews v. McNeill,
V. H. L.
98 Kan. 5; Hauk v. State, 148 Ind. 238, 26o.

NOTE AND COMMENT
CONSTRUCTION OF DEEDS CONTAINING REPUGNANT PROVISION.-The history
of a recent Hawaiian case presents both sides of a controversy of long standing as to the construction of inconsistent portions of a deed. The grantor,
in consideration of love and affection, and one dollar, conveyed by deed a
piece of land to her nephew, his heirs and assigns forever. Following the
granting clause were two others, one of which provided that all previous
instruments should be of no effect, the other that the deed should take effect
only after the death of the grantor and that if the grantee died first the land
should revert to the grantor and the instrument should be of no effect. The
grantor survived and the grantee's heir-at-law brought ejectment The trial
court held that the deed conveyed to the grantee only an estate in futuro in
fee, contingent upon his surviving the grantor. Upon appeal, the Supreme
Court of Hawaii reversed the lower court and held that the subsequent
clauses were repugnant to the granting clause and therefore should be rejected
and the first clause sustained, and that the deed in question conveyed to the
grantee an estate in fee simple. Kahaulelio v. Ihihi, 24 Haw. 292. The
Supreme Court in turn was reversed by the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (April 5, 1920), 263 Fed. 817, which held
that the instrument was of a testamentary character and not a deed (in
this connection see 18 MIcH. L. Rzv. 47o), but that the same conclusion
would be reached by holding it to be a deed. In the course of the opinion,
the last court said: "Taking into consideration all of its provisions and
endeavoring to give every part of it meaning and effect, it is obvious that
the intention was to vest the title in the grantee in case he survived the
grantor. That purpose being clear, there is no room for the application of
the common law doctrine of repugnancy."
The common law dealt with conflicts of this sort in extremely rigid
fashion, holding that the habendurn could never divest or infringe an estate
already vested by the granting clause and was void for repugnancy if it
524 [8th Ed.] ; 2 Black. 298; BREWSTER,
purported to do so. 4 KnNr CoI.
LAW OP CONVEYANCING, § i29; Eldridge v. See Yup Co., 17 Cal. 44; Riggin
v. Love, 72 Ill. 553; Robinson v. Pa3rne, 58 Miss. 69o; Ratliffe v. Mars, 87
Ky. 262. The application of this rule must have often resulted in defeating
the actual and express intent of the grantor. In recognition of this fact,
Kentucky cases of a comparatively early date are to be found which hold that
in case of conflict the subsequent clause should control on the theory that it
is the last expression of intention on the part of the grantor. Bodine v.
Arthur, 91 Ky. 53; Basket! v. Sellars,93 Ky. 2. These decisions were directly
influenced by a statute providing that the grantee might take a fee by deed
without the word "heirs" being used in the granting clause, unless a contrary intent was expressed in a subsequent portion of the instrument. This
construction has been generally adopted under statutes of a similar nature.
Montgomery v. Sturtevant, 41 Cal. 290; Welch v. Welch, 183 Ill. 237; Miller

v. Dunn, 184 Mo. 318.
These statutes were the result of a protest against the formalism of the
common law which soon began to manifest itself in numerous cases which
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were not decided under the influence of a statute. It is said in Brown v.
Browzn, 168 N. C. 4: "We have well-nigh discarded the technical rule of the
common law by which a deed was construed, under which undue prominence
and effect were given to formal parts and their position in the instrument,
to the sacrifice of the real intent of the grantor. We have gradually enlarged
our view and liberalized our methods, which were narrow, and now seek
'after the intention by putting a construction on' the deed as a whole and not
paying too much attention to technical forms of expression which tend to
conceal the true meaning. All parts of a deed are to be given due force
and effect. The old rule is still of value where the intent cannot be determined." Triplett v. Williams, 149 N. C. 394; Koehne v. Beattie, 36 R. I. 316;
and Hughes v. Hammond, 136 Ky. 394, are to the same effect.
The language of many of these cases would seem to indicate that the
doctrine of repugnancy as a rule of law is practically a thing of the past.
This is scarcely the case. It may safely be said that among the recent cases
there is a great deal of language tending to support the decision of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals in Kahaulelio v. Ihihi, supra. Nevertheless, there are still cases which cling steadfastly to the old rule.
In Carllee v. Ellsberry, 82 Ark. 209, the tabendum contained a proviso
to the effect that should the grantee die before her husband without issue
the estate should revert to him. It was held that the proviso was repugnant
to the granting clause and void. In 6 MicH. L. Rsv. 283 this case was said
to be in accord with the great weight of authority in the United States. So
numerous are -the cases upon this point, however, that in the course of the
same year (i9o7) a writer for the ILINOIS LAw RivImw found an abundance

of cases to support his contention that the weight of authority was rapidly
becoming settled to the contrary. 2 ILl,. L. RLv. 192. See also 12 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 956. During the past year at least one case has been decided which
is in accord with Carilee v. Ellsberry, supra, and the holding of the Supreme
Court of Hawaii in Kahaulelio v. Ihihi, supra. This case held that the
habendum and subsequent covenants may modify, limit and explain the grant,
but cannot defeat it when it is expressed in clear, unambiguous language.
The granting clause conveyed a fee and a subsequent clause contained a
,condition that the grantee should provide the grantor and his wife with a
good home until their death, and that the title should vest in the grantee
only on the death of both. It was held that a fee passed by the conveyance.
Bennett v. Bennett (Vt.),

1O7

Atl. 304.

In spite of a few scattered cases to the same effect, it may safely be said
that so far as language, is concerned, the doctrine of repugnancy has been
made at most a rule of construction in the majority of recent decisions upon
the point. It is by no means clear, however, that all or even a majority of
these would support the decision of the Court of Appeals in the principal
case other than by dicta. Most of these cases say that when the intention
can be discovered it will be followed. They also say that where the clauses
cannot be reconciled the old rule will be applied. The question as to reconcilability covers a multitude of sins; and there seems to be a line of demar-
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cation fully as real, if not as distinct, as that which featured the older conflict. The following cases illustrate the modem form of the controversy.
In Saull v. Vagfiie, 15 Ark. 695, a deed contained a proviso to the effect
that in the event of the grantee's death during minority or before the birth
of issue the property should revert to the grantors. The proviso was held
void for repugnancy on the ground that it could not be reconciled with the
granting clause and that the case was therefore a proper one for the application of the old rule. In Ray v. Spears, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 814, an attempt to
limit an absolute estate by a proviso that if the grantee should die without
children the property should revert to the grantor was held null and void,
following the reasoning in the preceding case.
On the other hand, in Theurinond v. Thurmond, 88 Ga. 182, the granting
clause vested an estate in two grantees, their heirs and assigns. A subsequent clause provided that at the death of one grantee his interest should
go to certain other persons who were named. It was held that the intention
was clearly shown to grant a life estate only to this grantee and the remainder was given effect.
In Bassett v. Budlong, 77 Mich. 338, there was a deed from a husband
to his wife granting certain property to her, heir heirs and assigns forever,
with restrictions as to conveying or mortgaging said property during the
lifetime of the grantor without his consent, and in case of the death of the
grantee prior to the grantor's decease the land was to revert to him and his
heirs. The court held that the intention was clear that the grantee should
receive only a life estate with a remainder contingent upon surviving the
grantor, and gave it effect accordingly.
All of the preceding cases subscribe verbally to the modern doctrine of
effectuating the intention of the parties. Each contains words which would
not be out of place in the most liberal of the recent cases, yet their decisions
cannot be reconciled. The influence of the old rule would seem to be responsible for the many cases where courts cannot reconcile clauses and are
obliged to apply the common law doctrine, while other courts are able to
discover and give effect to intentions of grantors on similar states of facts.
The Court of Appeals in Kahaulelio v. Ihihl, supra, went farther than
many courts which have displayed on equal amount of verbal liberality would
be willing to go. The effect of that decision is to hold that, despite the clear
and unambiguous language of the granting clause, nothing whatever vested
by the deed. Many courts would have evaded such a holding by seeking the
easy refuge of irreconcilability and applying the old rule. The Supreme
Court of Hawaii in the second trial of the same case rendered lip-service to
the doctrine of intention, but added that positive rules of law govern the
search, which is to say that the court is not in the least concerned with discovering or carrying out the real intent of the parties.
Considering the situation as a whole, it seems obvious that the problem
is by no means settled, though loose language on the part of the courts has
been responsible for many positive statements to the effect that the doctrine
of repugnancy will now be applied only as a last resort. There is so much
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difference of opinion as to what constitutes a "last resort" that the rule thus
stated is little more than a nullity. Undoubtedly there has been a distinct
change in the attitude of the courts during the past twenty years. Formerly,
conflicts were settled with a casual reference to Blackstone or Kent for an
expression of the old rule. Recent cases are few and far between which do
not at least contain language to the effect that the intention of the parties
A. W. B.
will be effectuated if discoverable.

MORTGAGES UPON STOCK IN TRADE CONsIsTING or AuTomoamts.--The practice is very common among automobile dealers, upon the receipt of a shipment of automobiles, to procure loans from banking institutions in order to
-pay the drafts attached to the bills of lading, and to secure the loans by the
execution of deeds of trust or chattel mortgages thereon. It has apparently
been assumed that such a deed of trust or chattel mortgage, when properly
executed and recorded, is valid against the claims of all persons whomsoever.
This assumption has undoubtedly been predicated upon the well-established
rule that priority of time gives priority of right, as between two equities,
where all the statutory requirements of execution and recordation have been
complied with. However, according to the generally accepted doctrine, when
the mortgagor of a stock in trade'is permitted by the mortgagee to remain in
possession and to make sales therefrom in the ordinary course of business,
,applying the proceeds to his own use if he sees fit, the transaction is held to
%e fraudulent and void as to creditors. See Ii C. J. 573 for collection of
authorities.
Although 'this rule has been repeatedly applied by the Virginia courts,
chattel mortgages and deeds of trust placed upon automobiles by dealers
were very common in that state. It has obviously been assumed that auto.mobiles, because of their size, value and susceptibility of accurate description,
did not come within the purview of this rule. This assumption was discovered
to be erroneous when the Supreme Court of Virginia, in the case of Boyce
v. Fintmce and Guaranty Company, in March, i92o, enunciated the rule that
such deeds of trust or chattel mortgages, though properly executed and
recorded, are void as to purchasers without notice. The rule would undoubt'edly also be applied as to creditors. In that case the court said:
"Property bought for the express purpose of daily indiscriminate sale to
the general public, exposed for such sale at the place of business of a licensed
dealer, and over which the dealer is permitted to exercise the dominion of
owner, cannot be made the subject of a valid chattel mortgage, regardless of
its size, value, or capacity for identification. The powers which the dealer is
permitted to exercise over the property in such care are inconsistent with a
mortgage thereon.
"To require an examination of the records for liens in such cases would
break up the business, and indeed be an embargo on legitimate trade. Capital must seek a more substantial security for its protection. Otherwise it
were better that the few should suffer than the general public who have been
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lured into purchasing from a dealer who has been entrusted with the indicia
of ownership. A purchaser in such case is not bound to see the application
of the purchase money.
"It is true, as a rule, the seller of personal chattels cannot confer upon a
purchaser any better title than he himself has, but if the owner stands by
and permits a seller who is a licensed dealer in such goods to hold himself
out to the world as the owner, to treat the goods as his own, place them
with other similar goods of his own in a public show room, and offer the
same indiscriminately with his own to the public, he will be estopped by his
conduct from asserting his ownership against a purchaser for value without
notice of his title. The constructive notice furnished by a recorded mortgage or deed of trust in such cases is not sufficient. The act of knowingly
permitting the goods to be so handled and used by the seller in the ordinary
and usual conduct of his business is just as destructive of the rights of the
creditor as if such permission had been expressly granted in the mortgage
or deed of trust"
The Supreme Court of Washington has accepted a conflicting view of the
proper doctrine to be applied to such deeds of trust or chattel mortgages.
See Ephraim v. Kelleher, 4 Wash. 243, 249, and State Bank v. Johnson, 177
Pac. 340. See also Levi v. Booth, 58 Id. 305, where the court said that "the
bare possession of goods, though he may happen to be a dealer in that class
of goods, does not clothe him with power to dispose of the goods as though
he were the owner, or as having authority as agent to sell or pledge the
goods, to the preclusion of the right of the real owner." But see the later
case of Dias v. Chickering, 64 Md. 348.
According to the instant case, it is not only immaterial that the mortgage
did not give a power of sale, but even that the mortgage provided against
sale, secretion, conversion, and removal.
The principles enunciated in the principal case certainly seem sound, and
they unquestionably respond to the dictates of public policy and commercial
C. L. K
convenience.

Norfolk, Va.
ERRATA.-Through an error, for which the author was in no sense responsible, a number of unfortunate mistakes were made in the printing of the
notes to the article of Mr. Thomas F. Carroll, appearing in the May number
of the Rmxviw.
In note 6, the reference to Mr. Harper's speech should be ANNALS, 5TH
CONG. I, 141. Note io, reference to MADISON'S WITINGS, should be Vol. VI
instead of VII. Note 12, the reference should be to ANNALS, 5TH CONG. II,
2142. Note 23, reference to MADISON'S WRITINGS, should be Vol. VI instead
ANNALS, 5TH CON . III, 2990. In note
30, last reference should be to Mr. Macon's speech. Note 31, last line should
read, "ANNALS, 5TH CONG. III, 2989." In note 67 the reference to the writings
of Jefferson should be Vol. VIII, p. 218. Note 68 should read, "MADISON'S

of IV. In note 29, citation should be

WEITINGS, VI, 334-335, etc. In note 7o, the reference should be to J. S.
BAssETT, THn FEDrRALIST SYSTem, instead of to FISKE, CRITIcAL. P=01o.

